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THE EFFECT OF THE NEW AGE OF MAJORITY
ON PREEXISTING CHILD SUPPORT
SETTLEMENTS
I. Introduction
Since the enactment of the twenty-sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution,' most states have passed legislation
lowering the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen.' A crucial
problem is whether these statutes affect or should affect child
support settlements which provide for support to the child until he
or she reaches the age of majority. More specifically, the key ques-
tion is whether children have a continuing right to support until age
twenty-one under settlements resulting from divorce decrees and
agreements made prior to the enactment of the new age of majority
laws.
In determining the effect of the age of majority statutes on exist-
ing support settlements courts have considered the nature of the
child support settlement, the language of statutes amending the age
of majority, the existence in the state statutes of a "saving provi-
sion," 3 and the intent of the parties as to the provisions of the
support settlement. Lack of specificity and or clarity in the statutes
or in the child support settlements has necessitated judicial resolu-
tion of the effect of the age of majority statutes on support settle-
ments made prior to the effective date of the statutes. This Note will
analyze the conflicts among state court decisions and indicate possi-
ble future trends.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 provides:
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of age.
2. At the time this Note went to press, all but five jurisdictions have enacted legislation
to change the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen. Alaska, Nebraska and Wyoming
have amended the age of majority to nineteen. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.010 (1965); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 38-101 (1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-1.1 (Supp. 1975). Alabama and Mississippi have
made no amendment and retain twenty-one as the age of majority.
3. These provisions are constructed to ensure that the age of majority amendments will
not affect prior settlements, decrees, rights or obligations. See text accompanying notes 78-
85 infra.
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II. The Nature of Child Support Settlements
One major factor which has influenced the courts in determining
the effect of the new age of majority laws on existing support settle-
ments is the nature of the support settlement. Child support settle-
ments may be divided into three basic categories: (1) those which
result from judicial decrees issued by divorce courts; (2) those which
are contained in property settlements or separation agreements; and
(3) those which stem from prior agreements between the parties and
are then incorporated into divorce decrees. Courts have generally
used these distinctions as a basis for ascertaining the proper legal
approach in deciding the effect of the new age of majority statutes
on support settlements.
A. Judicial Decrees
Where there has been no prior agreement between the parties as
to child support, the decisions are split as to the effect of the age of
majority statutes on child support provisions mandated by judicial
decrees; no trend in the law is discernable.
In Waldron v. Waldron4 an appellate court of Illinois held that
support had to be given until the child reached twenty-one. The
court said that since the age of majority was twenty-one at the
time of the decree, that was the age contemplated as the termina-
tion point for the support obligation. In Strum v. Strum5 the Illinois
court concluded that the divorce court's use of the term "minor"
referred to age twenty-one.' The court reasoned that at the time of
the decree the unequivocal meaning of "minor" was a male below
age twenty-one.7 Thus, use of that term could have but one mean-
ing, the court intended support to continue until the child reached
age twenty-one. The court in Strum went a step further by holding
that the rights of the child to support were fixed and determined
at the time of the decree and were not diminished by the amend-
ment of the age of majority in Illinois.'
The key issue in both Strum9 and Waldron'0 was the interpreta-
4. 13 Ill. App. 3d 964, 301 N.E.2d 167 (5th Dist. 1973).
5. 22 Ill. App. 3d 147, 317 N.E.2d 59 (4th Dist. 1974).
6. Id. at 150, 317 N.E.2d at 62.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Id. at 147, 317 N.E.2d at 59.
10. See 13 I1. App. 3d at 966, 301 N.E.2d at 170.
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tion of the term "majority" in the decrees. The Illinois courts have
consistently decided that "majority" refers to "age" rather than to
"status," and that the meaning must be determined as of the time
of the divorce decree rather than the time of the action.
In Baker v. Baker," the decree provided support for a daughter
until she shall reach the age of twenty-one. The Supreme Court of
Washington held that the age of majority statute'2 would not affect
the obligations under the prior decree. The court focused sharply on
the need to provide for education of the child, a prime function of
child support.'3 The court's holding that the divorced father was
obligated to provide for his daughter's college education at least
until she reached age twenty-one" demonstrates social awareness
and sets a proper standard for future decisions. However, there is
no evidence to date that the Baker reasoning has been followed.
The Michigan courts have been the source of much litigation as
to the effect of the age of majority statute on existing divorce de-
crees. In Barbier v. Barbier, '1 the divorce decree provided that sup-
port would continue until the child reaches twenty-one years of age.
After the age of majority was reduced to eighteen," the husband
moved to modify the decree and the wife asked the court for clarifi-
cation.'7 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the Age of Major-
ity Act did not affect the prior decree. 8
In Price v. Price" a divorce decree provided support for three
11. 80 Wash. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972).
12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.010 (Supp. 1975).
13. The purpose of child support is to help ensure the proper physical and educational
growth of the child and to place the responsibility for such growth upon the parents rather
than society. Today, a child has a legal right to be supported by his parents in every jurisdic-
tion in the United States. It is also unquestioned that parents have always had the moral
obligaton to support the children that they bring into the world. Early common law, however,
appears to have placed only a moral duty upon parents to support their children, but the
passage of statute 43 Eliz. c.2 in England in 1601 forced a legal obligation onto parents to
provide support for their children. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447-48; Note, Support
of the Child, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 284, 286-87 (1961).
14. 80 Wash. 2d at 742-43, 498 P.2d at 319-20. The public policy decision in Baker,
demonstrates insight into the problems of divorce and exhibits sensitivity for the children of
divorced parents. The Washington court has assessed the needs of the children especially in
regard to educational expenses and suggests a viable solution to this problem for many cases.
15. 45 Mich. App. 402, 206 N.W.2d 464 (Div. 1 1973).
16. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.52 (Supp. 1976).
17. 45 Mich. App. at 403, 206 N.W.2d at 465-66.
18. Id. at 405, 206 N.W.2d at 466.
19. 51 Mich. App. 656, 215 N.W.2d 756 (Div. 3 1974), rev'd, 395 Mich. 6, 232 N.W.2d 630
(1975).
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children until age eighteen or until graduation from high school,
whichever came later.2" After the county court ordered the husband
to finance his son's education, the Michigan Court of Appeals deter-
mined that since the Age of Majority Act made an eighteen year old
an adult for all purposes, support could not be properly awarded to
a child who has reached the age of eighteen.2" The court was aware
of the holding in Barbier but declined to follow that decision.2 The
Supreme Court of Michigan, however, reversed the appellate court
and said that child support could be awarded on the ground that
such was mandated by a saving clause in the Michigan Age of Ma-
jority statute.23
The intent of the divorce decree in Barbier was explicit - support
would continue until the child reached twenty-one. 4 In Price5 the
language of the decree was equally clear - support would continue
until each child reached eighteen or graduated from high school,
whichever came later. 8 However, in Allen v. Allen 7 the language of
the decree was ambiguous. The decree provided support for minors
until twenty-one. The use of the terms "minors" and "twenty-one"
caused no problem at the time of the decree when the age of major-
ity was twenty-one.28 However, the court in Allen determined that
the terms now had different meanings. In overturning a lower court
decision that payments should continue, the court concluded that
the use of the term "21" was not intended as a reference to age but
rather to the status of majority. Thus, the court held that the sup-
port obligation terminated at the age of majority which was now
eighteen .29
20. 51 Mich. App. at 660, 215 N.W.2d at 758.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 395 Mich. 6, 10, 232 N.W.2d 630, 632-33 (1975). The court especially noted that its
decision was consistent with other jurisdictions and cited to Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So.
2d 24 (Fla. 1975); Kirchner v. Kirchner, 465 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1971); Shoaf v. Shoaf, 14 N.C.
App. 231, 188 S.E.2d 19 (1972); Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972). 395
Mich. at 10, 232 N.W.2d at 632.
24. 45 Mich. App. at 403, 206 N.W.2d at 465.
25. 51 Mich. App. 656, 215 N.W.2d 756 (Div. 3 1974).
26. Id. at 660, 215 N.W.2d at 758.
27. 63 Mich. App. 475, 235 N.W.2d 22 (Div. 1 1975).
28. It is arguable, though, that the use of the phrase "until 21" served to demonstrate
the clear intent of the court in making the divorce decree.
29. 63 Mich. App. at 476, 235 N.W.2d at 22.
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The Louisiana courts determined the effect of the new statute on
divorce decrees in Fellows v. Fellows.3 0 The Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals chose to interpret the age of majority from the perspective of
the legislature which defined "majority."'" The court concluded
that the Legislature requires support payments during the minority
of the child, and that the obligation for a divorced parent to pay
child support ends when the child reaches the new age of majority
(eighteen) .32
The reported opinions on the effect of the age of majority statutes
on support obligations contained in divorce decrees are rather
evenly divided, and no clear trend has emerged. Where the language
of the agreement or the intent of the legislature is unclear, it would
be more beneficial to society and more consistent with aims of child
support to interpret the statutes in favor of the child so as not to
affect the existing support obligations.
B. Separation Agreements and Property Settlements
Prior to obtaining a divorce, parents often reach agreements as to
support for the children of the marriage. These settlements are
usually found in separation agreements or in property settlements.
There has been extensive litigation of the effect of the new age of
majority statutes on these support agreements. The present trend
of the law is to decide these cases through the application of con-
tract law,33 treating the support agreements as contracts between
the divorced parties. Most courts hold that the new statutes have
no effect on the rights and obligations derived from these contracts,
and that support must continue until the child reaches twenty-
one.
34
The separation agreement in Istnick v. Istnick3l provided that
child support would continue until the age of majority was at-
30. 267 So. 2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
31. Id. at 575-76.
32. Id. at 576. It should be noted that the Louisiana Legislature was silent as to the
application of the new age of majority statute on preexisting child support settlements. The
Louisiana courts purport to narrowly construe the age of majority statute, however, the
enactment lacks the specificity to permit clear compliance. See also Bernhardt v. Bernhardt,
283 So. 2d 226 (La. Supp. Ct. 1973).
33. See, e.g., Istnick v. Istnick, 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 307 N.E.2d 922 (C.P. 1973); Collins v.
Collins, 418 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. App. 1967).
34. Id.
35. 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 307 N.E.2d 922 (C.P. 1973).
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tained. Upon enactment of the Ohio law changing the age of major-
ity to eighteen,37 the divorced husband sought an order terminating
the support obligation2 The court held that the agreement obli-
gated the husband to provide child support until the child reached
age twenty-one. 9
The Kentucky courts have provided the forum for extensive litiga-
tion of the contractual nature of support agreements. In Collins v.
Collins,4" the court construed a contract which provided that sup-
port would continue until the age of majority." The court found that
the subsequent statutory change which lowered the age of majority
to eighteen did not affect the obligation to provide support until age
twenty-one. 2 This was clearly the intent of the parties" at the time
of the contract."
36. Id.
37. Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (Page Supp. 1975).
38. 37 Ohio Misc. at 92, 307 N.E.2d at 923.
39. Id. at 93, 307 N.E.2d at 925.
40. 418 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1967).
41. Id. at 740.
42. Id.
43. In order to determine the intent of the parties the courts look to the language of the
agreement. The interpretation of the language has always been a major point of contention
since variance in interpretation may greatly affect the rights and obligations of the parties.
The most enlightened judicial treatment of this issue may be found in Waymire v. Waymire,
10 Wash. App. 262, 517 P.2d 219 (Div. 3 1973). The court in Waymire agreed with the trial
judge who stated:
"As a practical matter, whether divorce decrees use the wording, 'age of twenty-one'
or 'age of majority', depends upon the preferred language of the particular lawyer who
wrote the decree, not the intent of the party or the judge ...
"Whatever the reasons why lawyers chose to use the different phraseology, I cannot
order a father to pay support money for three additional years simply because, by the
luck of the draw, he chose a lawyer who liked 'age of twenty-one' in his divorce
papers. ...
"At the time of the entry of the decree in this case, the age of majority was twenty-
one. This is what everyone had to have in mind and intend in using the phrase, 'age
of majority'."
Id. at 264-65, 517 P.2d at 221.
44. 418 S.W.2d at 739-40. In Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974), the Virginia
Supreme Court decided the question of the effect of the age of majority change on prior
property settlements and support agreements similarly to the Kentucky courts. The Virginia
court said, the basic rule in construction of contracts is that the law in force at the making
of the contract determines the rights of the parties and will control. 214 Va. at 653, 203 S.E.2d
at 125. The Virginia court went further and said that the rule of construction that laws are
presumed to be prospective and not retrospective should govern, and the ascertained intent
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The Kentucky courts have been quite strict in requiring proof of
a contractual obligation for support. In Blackard v. Blackard" such
proof was lacking. The separation agreement provided that support
would continue until further orders of the court." In examining the
agreement the court found no contractual intent as to the termina-
tion of support. 7 Therefore, the court concluded that absent a con-
tract with a clear expression of the parties' intention, the new age
of majority law worked to terminate the obligation upon the eight-
eenth birthday of the child.4"
In Phelps v. Phelps," the support agreement provided that sup-
port would continue until the child became twenty-one years of age
or married or otherwise became emancipated." The husband termi-
nated payment when his child reached age eighteen, basing his
action on the new age of majority law.5 The New Mexico court
concluded that the child was emancipated by operation of law upon
his eighteenth birthday and that the contractual obligaton was
automatically terminated."
The Kansas courts also treated a support agreement as a contract,
and absent a clear intent in the agreement, they would not require
of the parties to the agreement should be enforced. Id. As the court in Paul found clear
evidence that the parties intended that support continue at least until the child reached age
twenty-one, it held that the statutory change in the age of majority had no effect on the
support obligation, in view of the established contract. Id. at 654, 203 S.E.2d at 125-26.
The Maryland court decided the issue of the effect of the age of majority change on pre-
existing support agreements in a manner similar to the Virginia court in Monticello v. Monti-
cello, 271 Md. 168, 315 A.2d 520, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974). It ruled that the written
agreement of the parties will be treated as a contract and will be enforced. The court here
attempted to overcome the barrier of ambiguous construction in support agreements by
enumerating the most common terms used in reference to the duration or termination of
support and saying they will be interpreted to have intended age twenty-one. It held:
the use of phrases such as "infant" child, "minor" child, "during infancy," "during
minority," "until attaining majority," or "until age of majority," in an agreement or
in a decree relating to child support dated prior to 1 July 1973, must have meant ...
age twenty-one, in the absence of a clear expression of contrary intent . ...
271 Md. at 173-74, 315 A.2d at 523.
45. 426 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1968).
46. Id. at 472.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 472-73. See also Young v. Young, 413 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1967).
49. 85 N.M. 62, 509 P.2d 254 (1973).
50. Id. at 64, 509 P.2d at 256.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 65, 509 P.2d at 257.
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child support beyond that mandated by law. In Rice v. Rice,53 the
Kansas Supreme Court stated, "where a greater liability for child
support than that prescribed by law is sought to be imposed
pursuant to contract, such intention must be clearly expressed in
the contract."54
In determining the effect of the age of majority statutes on sup-
port obligations incurred through support agreements, courts look
to the intent of the parties to the contract. Where that intent is
unclear an interpretation in favor of the child is preferable, espe-
cially because the purpose of child support is to help ensure the
physical and educational growth of the child. Courts, as in Phelps"
and Rice,5" have too often been insensitive to this consideration.
C. Support Agreements Incorporated Into Divorce Decrees
Support agreements between parties are often incorporated into
divorce decrees to bring their provisions under the jurisdiction of the
domestic relations courts. The courts have disagreed as to the effect
of the change in the age of majority on prior support settlements
later incorporated into divorce decrees." The decisions are split and
it is impossible to mark the direction of the law pertaining to this
type of settlement.
Jungjohann v. Jungohann58 is a leading case for the jurisdictions
that have held that the new age of majority statutes modify the
rights of children under existing support settlements.59 In
Jungjohann the district court terminated the obligation of a father
to pay support for his nineteen year old daughter after the enact-
ment of legislation which reduced the age of majority to eighteen."0
The property settlement which was incorporated into the divorce
decree provided that support would continue under the settlement
until the child attained the age of majority, not the specific age of
53. 213 Kan. 800, 518 P.2d 477 (1974).
54. Id. at 805, 518 P.2d at 481.
55. 85 N.M. 62, 509 P.2d 254 (1973).
56. 213 Kan. 800, 518 P.2d 477 (1974).
57. Cf. Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, 213 Kan. 329, 516 P.2d 904 (1973); Turner v. Turner,
441 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1969).
58. 213 Kan. 329, 516 P.2d 904 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Schmitz, 70 Wis.2d 882, 236 N.W.2d 657 (1975); Mason v.
Mason, 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d 781 (1973).
60. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-101 (1973).
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twenty-one." The Kansas Supreme Court said that minority is a
legal status rather than a fixed or vested right, and that a status
which is created by the law may be subject to statutory limits or
exceptions. 2 Finding that no contractual rights attached to the
property settlement, the court held that the age of majority statute
controlled and that the support obligation for the nineteen year old
child terminated upon the enactment of the statute. 3
The Tennessee court in Whitt v. Whitt" said that when a support
agreement is incorporated into a decree, it loses its contractual na-
ture. '  The court then held that the provisions of the new age of
majority statute6 would control and found that the obligation to
pay support terminated when the child achieved age eighteen. 7
Several other courts, which have reached a similar conclusion,
have relied on the wording of the agreement. In Schmitz v.
Schmitz,"5 a divorced father discontinued support payments for his
two children aged nineteen and twenty after the Wisconsin statute
changed the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the obligation for support had
terminated upon the enactment of the statute. 0 The court found
61. 213 Kan. at 330, 516 P.2d at 905.
62. Id. at 332, 516 P.2d at 907.
63. Id. at 336, 516 P.2d at 909.
64. 490 S.W.2d 159 (Tenn. 1973).
65. Id. at 160.
66. TFNN. CODE ANN. § 1-313 (Supp. 1976).
67. 490 S.W.2d at 160.
68. 70 Wis.2d 882, 236 N.W.2d 657 (1975). See Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d
781 (1973); Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tenn. 1973). Although the result in Whitt
is similar to those in Jungjohann, Mason and Schmitz, i.e., that the obligation for support
terminates when the child reaches eighteen, the decisions are distinguishable. In Jungjohann
the Kansas court said there are no contractual rights attached to support settlements. 213
Kan. at 333, 516 P.2d at 908. In Mason the court did not address the issue of contractual rights
at all. 84 N.M. at 720-24, 507 P.2d at 781-85. Therefore, it seems that the New Mexico court
does not interpret support settlements to be contractual in nature. The Wisconsin court in
Schmitz held that contractual rights do attach to support agreements at their making, how-
ever, subsequent to the statutory changes in the age of majority these rights are lost as to
children over eighteen. 70 Wis.2d at 891, 236 N.W.2d at 662-63. In Whitt the Tennessee court
said support settlements are contractual in nature and rights do attach. 490 S.W.2d at 160.
The court said, however, upon incorporation of this settlement into a divorce decree contrac-
tual rights and obligations terminate and only rights under the decree continue. The court
then held that divorce decrees are subject to modification by statutory changes. Id.
69. 70 Wis. 882, 236 N.W.2d 657 (1975).
70. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 52.01(1)(a) (Supp. 1976), amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.01 (1957).
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that the agreement's use of the phrase "minor children" was crucial,
and 'held that the children no longer had any right to support when
the law changed the age of majority. Reference in the agreement to
"age 21," according to the court, was merely to be descriptive.7'
In Mason v. Mason7" the New Mexico Supreme Court examined
a stipulation made part of a final divorce decree which provided for
support of two children during "minority" or until they were
"emancipated." 73 The court held that the children were emanci-
pated by statute74 and that the husband was relieved of his duty.75
The court did not address the question of contractual obligation.
In Turner v. Turner,7" the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that
the support obligation was contractual in nature and it was the
parties' intent that the contractual obligation to support not be
affected by the statutory change in the age of majority."
It is obvious that there is little agreement in the law as to the
effect of the new age of majority on support settlements incorpo-
rated into divorce decrees. It is equally clear there is no consenus
as to the approach in deciding the issue. If the incorporation can be
viewed merely as a means of bringing the agreement within the
jurisdiction of the domestic relations courts for the purpose of en-
forcement then the agreement may be treated simply as a contract
between the parties.
71. 70 Wis.2d at 889, 236 N.W.2d at 661.
72. 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d 781 (1973).
73. Id. at 721, 507 P.2d at 782.
74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-13-1 (1976).
75. 84 N.M. at 723-24, 507 P.2d at 784-85.
76. 441 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1969).
77. Id. at 108. See also Worrell v. Worrell 489 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1973). The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals decided a similar case in Dimitroff v. Dimitroff, 218 S.E.2d 743
(W. Va. 1975). In Dimitroff, a support obligation, defined in an agreement and incorporated
into a divorce decree by stipulation, provided child support would continue until the child
reached twenty-one unmarried and emancipated. The court here did not apply the rationale
of contractual obligations, rather it relied on the applicable saving provision, (W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 2-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976)), holding that the support obligation continued until the
child reached twenty-one. See Yaeger v. Yaeger, 229 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 1975), where similar
provisions were made by oral stipulation and later incorproated into a divorce decree.
In Jones v. Jones, 503 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973), an agreement incorporated into
a divorce decree stipulated that child support would be paid until the child reached twenty-
two. The Tennessee court found clear contractual intent that supported termination at age
twenty-two, and that this provision was made independently from any statutory obligation,
since at the time of the agreement the law required child support until the child reached
twenty-one. Id. at 928-29. Thus, the court found that support should continue until the child
reached twenty-two irrespective of the new age of majority law. Id. at 929.
NOTES
III. Construction of the Statutes
An examination of the various statutes which have changed the
age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen generally indicates a
lack of specificity and a failure to demonstrate a clear intent as to
the application of the statutes on prior child support settlements."
In order to avoid misinterpretation and to make clear that the intent
was not to affect established rights under existing support settle-
ments, several states have enacted saving provisions to supplement
their age of majority acts.7" These enactments generally provide that
the new age of majority laws shall not be construed to alter, change,
affect, impair or defeat any rights, obligations or interests accrued,
incurred or conferred prior to the effective date of the particular
act. 0 The purpose of these saving provisions is to lend stability to
prior settlements and to afford a measure of security to those pro-
tected by the settlements.
The California courts have seen extensive litigation concerning
the effect of the age of majority act and its accompanying saving
provisions"' on existing support settlements. In Atwell v. Atwell 2
the California Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature em-
ployed the term "age of majority" to refer to twenty-one and over
in agreements and instruments made prior to the effective date of
the statute and to refer to eighteen and over subsequent to the
effective date. The court then said that child support orders will not
be affected by the new legislation if the original decree was made
prior to the effective date of the statute.8 3 The states which have
78. Other states have gone to great lengths to insure clarity. For example in 1974 the New
York legislature passed fifty-three bills designed to lower the age of majority to eighteen,
effective September 1974. The result of this method of legislation is that legislative intent is
clear; the new age of majority will apply only where specifically mandated by the enactments.
It is noteworthy that the New York Domestic Relations Law was not modified as to statutory
support obligations; the law continues to require child support until twenty-one. N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW § 32-2 (McKinney 1964). For a discussion of the New York enactments, see Com-
ment, A Survey of the Statutes Affected by the Reduction of the Age of Majority in New York,
39 ALBANY L. REV. 493 (1975).
79. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 25.1 (West Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-le(Supp. Pamphlet 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 701 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07 (West
Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-104.1 (1973); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722-54 (Supp.
1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-12-2 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-3-1 (Add. Supp. 1976).
80. Id.
81. CAL; CIv. CODE § 25.1 (West Supp. 1976).
82. 39 Cal. App. 3d 383, 114 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1974).
83. Id. at 388, 114 Cal. Rptr. 327. This holding was followed in Lungstrom v. Lungstrom,
19771
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enacted saving provisions"4 generally have held that the statute
should be construed only prospectively and that existing support
settlements in force before the effective date of the act are not
affected.85
In jurisdictions without saving provisions, courts have reached a
contrary result finding a legislative intent to modify rights under
existing support settlements. In Jungjohann v. Jungjohann,sl the
court said that infancy is a status created by the law and subject to
statutory limits or exceptions. 7 The court then held that the age of
majority statute changed the rights of children under prior support
settlements." While the Kansas court held that the age of majority
statute should be applied prospectively, it said that the statute may
affect prior settlements."8 The court achieved this result by reason-
ing that the statute is not applied retrospectively if it does not affect
rights accrued prior to its effective date.'" In sum, if the statute does
not reach back to make a person an adult from and after his eight-
eenth birthday but only operates from and after its effective date,
July 1, 1972, then the application is prospective and valid.,' Thus
under the theory in Jungjohann the obligation to continue support
to a child over eighteen is terminated only as of July 1, 1972.2
The rationale which pervades these decisions is best illustrated in
White v. White93 where the Florida court, in a case not falling under
the saving provision of the Florida statute, held the obligation for
41 Cal. App. 3d 158, 115 Cal. Rptr. 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1974), where the court said the purpose
of Atwell was to allow preenactment child support to continue unabated until the former age
of majority is reached. The clearest statement made by the California courts on the issue is
in Phillips v. Phillips, 39 Cal. App. 3d 723, 725, 114 Cal. Rptr. 362, 363 (Ct. App. 1974), where
the court said the legislature specifically stated in any order or direction of a court affecting
child support entered prior to the effective date of this act a reference to minority shall be
deemed a reference to the age of twenty-one years.
84. See note 79 supra.
85. Monticello v. Monticello, 271 Md. 168, 315 A.2d 520, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974);
Vicino v. Vicino, 30 Conn. Supp. 49, 298 A.2d 241 (Super. Ct. 1972).
86. 213 Kan. 329, 516 P.2d 904 (1973).





92. Id.; see Baker v. Baker, 217 Kan. 319, 537 P.2d 171 (1975); Stanley v. Stanley, 112
Ariz. 282, 541 P.2d 382 (1975).
93. 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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support ends at eighteen unless the child is physically or mentally
incompetent or for other reasons unable to be independent. 4 The
court stated that "[wihen the legislature, in its infinite wisdom,
emancipated eighteen year old children, it specifically provided that
they enjoy and 'suffer' the rights, privileges 'and obligations' of
persons twenty-one years of age and older.""5
IV. Conclusion
There is little agreement as to the effect of the age of majority
statutes on existing support settlements. Where the settlement de-
rives from a divorce decree the direction of the law appears to be
toward continuing the obligation to support until the child reaches
twenty-one." Where the settlement has resulted from and agree-
ment between the parties, the courts have sought to find their ex-
press intent and have enforced contracts even where the obligation
exceeded the statutory requirements. Where support agreements
have been incorporated into divorce decrees, the decisions of the
courts have limited the support obligation.
In determining the effect of the new age of majority statutes, it is
also necessary to recall that the purpose of child support is to make
the parent responsible for the proper development of the child so
that he or she may become a productive member of society. Persons
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one are encumbered with
numerous economic disabilities. Many are in college and are not
earning income.97 Those who do seek employment experience a far
higher unemployment rate than the population generally. 8 Thus,
94. Id. at 621, citing Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952).
95. 296 So. 2d at 624.
96. In New York, for example, the change in the age of majority statute gave eighteen
year olds, for the first time, the right to contract for insurance on their own, the right to settle
an insurance claim on their own behalf without a guardian, and the right to be a director or
trustee of a bank. However, the defense of infancy is no longer available for persons between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. For a complete discussion of the effect of New York's
new age of majority law on the rights of eighteen to twenty-one year olds, see Comment, supra
note 78, at 493-94, 500, 509.
97. According to the United States Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, 47
percent of all high school graduates in 1973 went directly on to college. Of those students,
only about one-third worked or looked for work while going to school. MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
September 1974, at 50.
98. According to the United States Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics,
14.2 percent of those people between the ages of eighteen and nineteen seeking work in 1974
were unemployed. The unemployment rate for twenty to twenty-four year olds was 9 percent
19771
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courts should remember that such persons may not have the finan-
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and for twenty-five year olds and older 3.6 percent. For 1973, the unemployment rates were
12.4 percent for eighteen and nineteen year olds, 7.8 percent for twenty to twenty-four year
olds, and 3.1 percent for twenty-five year olds and older. MONTHLY LAB. REV., December 1975,
at 81 (table 5).
